Introduction
Association agreements concluded by the eu and non-eu States often contain provisions that are worded similarly, or even identically, as eu law. This is true in particular where an agreement provides for the association of the noneu State with the Union's internal market, i.e. provisions that deal with the free movement of goods, persons, services and/or capital. However, under the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ecj), the same or similar wording does not necessarily lead to the same interpretation. Rather, interpretation has to be context-related. The present contribution discusses the role of this so-called Polydor principle in relation to three association systems, namely the law of the European Economic Area (eea), which links the 28 eu Member States with the three eea/efta States Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, further the Ankara Association Law between the eu and Turkey and, finally, Treaties concluded by the eu and Switzerland, which is the fourth efta State but does not participate in the eea. In Switzerland, the eu-Swiss agreements are commonly termed "the bilateral law," which terminology is also used in this contribution.
The focus on these three regimes has been chosen because, different from looser Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, all of them concern associations of non-eu States with (parts of) the Union's internal market. The highest degree of association in that respect is that of eea law, where the full four freedoms of the Union's internal market are extended to the eea/efta States through the eea Agreement.2 Not included are in particular agriculture, the customs union and external trade, the Economic and Monetary Union and eu citizenship. The second highest level of association is that of the eu-Swiss bilateral law, where a number of the overall more than 100 agreements cover selective aspects of the free movement of goods, persons and services,3 the most far-reaching element being that of the movement of natural persons. In contrast, there is no full free movement of goods (with the exception of cheese) and of legal persons. Finally, the overall lowest level of association is that of the Ankara Agreement (aa).4 Even though this Agreement was concluded in 1962 with the aim of developing an encompassing system of economic freedoms, only the regime on goods is fully-fledged today, including even a customs union. However, whilst there is no free movement in the field of persons and services, there are still certain parallels with eu law. In addition, in the absence of free movement rules, standstill clauses have developed into meaningful legal instruments through the case-law of the ecj.5
In court practice, the requirement of context-related interpretation is usually relied on in order to justify a more limited interpretation of provisions of association law than of eu law. Conversely, the argument of context-related interpretation is sometimes also used in academic writing in favour of a broad interpretation, for example with respect to the Ankara Association Law and in view of the Court's often repeated statement that this law must be interpreted by analogy with eu free movement rules so far as is possible.6 Thus, it has been argued e.g. by Guild & Groenendijk7 as well as by Ídriz/Tezcan (though here with some additional nuances),8 that the reception of services must be covered by the Ankara Association Law in such a way that individuals derive rights from 2 European Economic Area Agreement, signed in 1992, [1994] 
